Global Business & Development Law Journal
Volume 3 | Issue 2

Article 14

1-1-1990

Wood Pulp- The European Economic Community
and Effects Doctrine Jurisdiction: The
Community's New Weapon
Steven T. Gubner
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe
Part of the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Steven T. Gubner, Wood Pulp- The European Economic Community and Effects Doctrine Jurisdiction: The Community's New Weapon, 3
Transnat'l Law. 759 (1990).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe/vol3/iss2/14

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Global Business & Development Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
mgibney@pacific.edu.

Note

Wood Pulp - The European Economic

Community and Effects Doctrine
Jurisdiction: The Community's New

Weapon

Table of Contents

I.

INTRODUCTION .........................

II.

IN RE WOOD PULP -- THE CASE .............

A.

B.

C.

761

763
763
ProceduralBackground ..............
1.
Commission's Conclusions in 1984 . 763
2.
1984 Commission's Analysis of
765
"Effects" Doctrine In Wood Pulp I
765
(a) Analysis and Findings .....
767
(b)
Issues on Appeal ........
Commission's Analysis in 1988 Wood Pulp
768
H..............................
1.
Question Posed by the ECJ on
768
Appeal ....................
2.
Specific Conduct Violating the
770
Treaty ....................
The Advocate General's Opinion in Wood
771
Pulp I .........................
The Effects Doctrine With Respect to
1.
772
Community Law ..............
2.
The Effects Doctrine and
InternationalLaw .............
774
(a)
InternationalCase Law .... 775

759

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 3
(b)

D.

H1.

776
776
777

780
781
781
783
784
786
786
787
789

FACTORS LEADING UP To WOOD PULP .........

A.
B.

IV.

Conflicts of Community
Effects Jurisdiction With
InternationalLaw .......
3.
Principles of United States Case
Law ......................
(a)
The Judiciary'sApproach to
Effects Doctrine Jurisdiction
(b)
The Restatement of Foreign
Relations and "Effects"
DoctrineJurisdiction .....
4.
The Advocate General's Suggested
Criterion in Wood Pulp II .......
(a)
Suggested Approaches ....
(b)
The Qualified Effects Test ..
5.
The Advocate General's Position on
JurisdictionOver The KEA ......
The European Court of Justice's Decision .
1.
The Court's Analysis of
Infringements in Wood Pulp H ....
2.
The ECJ's Placement of Conduct ..
3.
JurisdictionOver the KEA Cartel ..

790
Historical Forces Behind The Creation of
the EEC .......................... 790
The EEC's PriorExercise of Jurisdiction . 791
1.
Dyestuffs Case ................ 791
2.
ProfessorJenning'sAnalysis .....
793

PROBLEMS WITH THE EEC UTILIZING EFFFCTs

DOCTRNE JURSDICTION ..................... 795
A.
Problems With The PoliticalEntity Aspect of
"Effects" Jurisdiction ..............
795
B.
Effects Jurisdictionas an Economic Weapon
by the EEC ........................ 797
V.

760

CONCLUSION ..........................

800

1990/ Wood Pulp - Effects Doctrine Jurisdiction

I. INTRODUCTION
For the past eighteen years, the European Economic Community
(EEC)1 has been indecisive regarding the extension of jurisdiction
over non-EEC companies in violation of the Community's anticompetition rules in Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC's Treaty.2
Article 85 allows the assertion of jurisdiction whenever "any
activity is directed at the Community." 3 The problem until now
has been the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) reluctance to
sustain the Community's use of "effects" jurisdiction." In 1972,
1. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, openedfor signature Mar.
25, 1957, (entered intoforce Jan. 1, 1958) 298 U.N.T.S. II [hereinafter Treaty]. This Treaty is also
known as the Treaty of Rome. For an excellent discussion of the history and development of the
EEC, see generally Slynn, Aspects of the Law of the European Economic Community, 18 CORNELL
INT'L LJ.1 (1985) [hereinafter Slynn]. For a more recent comprehensive analysis of the EEC, see
generally Hoffman, The EuropeanCommunity and1992,68 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 27 (Fall 1989). The
members of the EEC are France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, and Spain. Portugal joined the
Community bringing the membership current See Slynn, supra.
2. See, e.g., Europemballage and Continental Can v. Comm'n, 1973 E. Comm.Ct. J.Rep.
215, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8171 (applying articles 85 and 86
to non-EEC defendants); Isituto Chemioterapico Italiano & Commercial Solvents v. Comm'n, 1974
E. Comm Ct. J. Rep. 223 [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8209 (Article 86
applies to commercial and industrial activities supplying the member states); Imperial Chemical
Indus. v. Comm'n, 1972 E. Comm. CL J.Rep. 619, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 8161 (imputing liability on foreign parent through EEC subsidiary) [hereinafter Dyestuffs] .
Note for most cases, the Commission imposed fines for anti-competition violations which
are contained in Articles 85 and 86 of the European Economic Community Treaty.
The Community defines concerted practice as: A concerted practice by its nature, does not
contain all of the elements of an agreement, but it could result from a coordination that is manifested
in the conduct of the participants ... where parallel conduct makes it possible for the enterprises to
achieve price equilibrium at a level other than the level that would have resulted from competition
..
, Back reference
2021.05, Treaty at art. 85, supra, note 1.
3. See Treaty at art. 85, supra, note 1.
4. The "effects" doctrine is a term of art referring to subjective or objective territoriality.
The subjective territorial principle recognizes jurisdiction when the conduct creating the effect occurs
inside the boundaries of the country asserting jurisdiction.
Objective territoriality is some form of effect that occurs within the boundaries of a country,
while the physical conduct producing the outcome occurred outside the boundaries. For a detailed
discussion, see A.D. NEALE & M.L STEHENS, INTERNATONAL BusINESs AND NATIONAL
JURISDICTION (1988). For a good comparison of different approaches to objective territoriality, see
also, Boyer, Form as Substance: A Comparison of Antitrust Regulation by Consent Decrees in the
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the ECJ decided a landmark group of cases on this issue. The lead
case was Imperial Chemical Industries v. Commission In this
case, the ECJ recognized the potential for the future use of
"effects" jurisdiction. However, the court in Dyestuffs found
jurisdiction without having to adopt the "effects" doctrine.
Nevertheless, Dyestuffs represented the EEC's first major step in
the adoption of "effects" jurisdiction.
In 1988, the European Court of Justice had the opportunity in
A. Ahistrom Oy and Others v. Comm'n (Wood Pulp I1),' to utilize
"effects" jurisdiction previously examined in Dyestuffs. In Wood
Pulp II, the ECJ validated the Community's earlier action of
imposing fines on wood pulp producers located outside the EEC.7
Jurisdiction over the producers was upheld for the first time based
on the "effects" doctrine. The Court stated that the focus for
violations of Articles 85 and 868 and the correlative jurisdiction
over anti-competitive actions stem from the conduct producing
those effects.' The court concluded that the correct focus for anticompetitive conduct in violation of the Treaty is where the
agreements were performed and not where they were formed."0
This note examines the decision in Wood Pulp. Part II analyzes
the initial decision in 1984 by the European Economic Commission
asserting authority over and levying fines against the addressees.
Further, the Commission's answers to questions posed by the
European Court of Jistice on appeal, the Advocate General's
Opinion, and the Court's final conclusions are examined. Part III

USA, Reports of the Monopolies and Mergers Commission in the UK, and Grants of Clearance by
the European Commission, 32 INT'L & CoMP. LQ. 904 (1983) [hereinafter Boyer]. See generally,
RESTATEMENT CHIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, §§ 402, 403 (1987).
5. [1972] Comm. Mkt. LR. 557, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCII) $
8161; J.R. Geigy v. Comm'n, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 787, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $8164; Sandoz v. Comm'n, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 845, [1971-1973 Transfer
binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8165.
6. 127 OJ. EUR. CoMM. 6 (Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116-117/85 & 125-129/85), [1988]
4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 901 [hereinafter Wood Pulp 11].
7. The case took four years for the appeal by the wood pulp producers and various cartels to
reach the E=, to be argued, and then finally decided in 1988.
8. See Treaty, supra note 1.
9. Wood Pulp I at 941.
10. Id.
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reviews the historical development of the EEC before the decision
in Wood Pulp. Finally, the implications of the court's decision are
addressed. The article concludes that the ECI's broad definition of
conduct in Wood Pulp may lead to protectionistic policies in
pursuit of a unified Common Market in 1992." The definition of
conduct is simply too expansive to permit the Community's
equitable application of "effects" jurisdiction.
II. IN RE WOOD PULP -- THE CASE

A. ProceduralBackground
1. Commission's Conclusions in 1984
In 1984, the European Economic Commission (Commission)
announced its decision (Wood Pulp 1) to impose sanctions against
undertakings which engaged in anti-competitive conduct,
specifically price-fixing.'2 The Commission, acting in its
administrative capacity, investigated the suspected undertakings for
over eight years before announcing its findings. In Wood Pulp I,
the Commission concluded that forty-one wood pulp producers13
and two trade associations, Fincell and KEA," engaged in anticompetitive price regulating between 1973 and 1981 in violation of
Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty.' 5 Over 800 paper

11. See Single European Act of Feb. 17,1986, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 [1987]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 21,000.
12. Comm'n Decision, Wood Pulp, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 85) 1 (1985), [Jan. 1982-June
1985 New Developments Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,654 [hereinafter Wood

Pulp I].
13. Joined cases 89, 104, 114, 116, 117 and 125 to 129/85: (A. Ahlstrom Oy (Case 89/85);
Bowater Inc. (Case 104/85); Pulp, Paper and Paperboard Export Assoc. (Case 114/85); St. AnneNackawic Pulp and Paper Co. (Case 116/85); Int'l Pulp Sales (Case 117/85); Westar Timber (Case
125/85); Weldwood of Canada (Case 126/85); Macmillan Bloedal (Case 127/85); Canadian Forest
Products (Canfor) (Case 128/85); and British Columbia Forest Products (Case 129/85) v. Comm'n,
1988 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. .
[1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 901.
14. KEA is now called Pulp, Paper and Paper Board, but is still referred to as KEA which is
registered under exceptions contained in the Webb-Pomerene Act, (15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976)).
15. For the purposes of this article, the focus will be on the two biggest violators, the KEA and
Fincell cartels.
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manufacturers exist within the EEC which generally" are supplied
with wood pulp17 from outside sources in order to produce paper
products. 8 The Commission found approximately two-thirds of
sales and sixty percent of the wood pulp used by the paper
manufacturers within the Community had been affected by the anticompetitive conduct of producers located outside the Community.
The Commission asserted jurisdiction over the undertakings in
question based on this effect, regardless of whether the
undertakings in question were actually located within the
Community itself.
The producers and cartels were charged with and ultimately
held responsible for, promulgating and carrying out price-fixing
procedures.19 The Commission found offending producers had set
controlling sale prices standing for a minimum of three months
while also including prohibitions against re-sale of wood pulp in all
sales contracts.' The Commission concluded in Wood Pulp I that
the restrictions placed upon the paper manufacturers ultimately
affected the Common Market. In Wood Pulp I, two specific types
of conduct were found to be anti-competitive. The first type,
prevented the re-sale of wood pulp within the Community by paper
manufacturers.' The second type, prevented manufacturers within
the Community from enjoying competition for wood pulp

16. Approximately 60% of all the wood pulp utilized for production of paper products comes
from sources outside the EEC. Id. at 908. Further, the other wood pulp producers distributing their
product within the EEC were not fined because the commission concluded that they had not engaged
in anti-competitive practices. See Comm'n Decision, Wood Pulp, 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 85)
1 (1985), [Jan. 1982-June 1985 New Developments Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1
10,654. Comm'n Press Release, No. IP (84) 468, Brussels, Dec. 20, 1984, [Jan. 1982-June 1985 New
Developments Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 10,654 at 11,547-34.
17. Id. at 902. "Wood pulp" is a chemical pulp known as "bleached sulphate pulp." Of all
the pulps, this type is the highest quality and can be used for a wide variety of paper products. Id.
at 906.
18. Wood Pulp II at 902.
19. Id. at 901.
20. Id. at 915.
21. Id. Natural market and sales conditions would always produce excesses or declines in an
individual manufacturer's demand for wood pulp thereby making it necessary to obtain or re-re-sell
wood pulp previously purchased based on anticipated demand.

1990 / Wood Pulp - Effects Doctrine Jurisdiction
purchased for manufacture through the concertation of prices by
offending producers situated outside the community.'
The Commission found that KEA and Fincell had also engaged
in anti-competitive conduct producing effects within the EEC. The
principle activity complained of was the open discussion of price
setting and the free flow of information between the cartel's
members resulting in the violation of anti-competition rules
contained in the Articles.'
The KEA cartel was a trade
association registered and maintained in the United States. KEA
is a non-profit association, promoting the commercial interests of
its members in the exportation of their products.' However, KEA
did not itself engage in the manufacturing, selling, or distribution
of wood pulp.'
2. 1984 Commission'sAnalysis of "Effects" Doctrine In Wood
Pulp I
(a)

Analysis and Findings

In Wood Pulp I, the Commission expressly adopted the
"effects" doctrine by focusing on the effect of trade within the
member states.26
The Commission asserted jurisdiction
notwithstanding the fact that the completed activity took place
outside the Community and affected additional markets other than
those located within the Community.'
The assertion of
jurisdiction was partially based on the Commission's conclusion
that all addressees to this decision were doing business within the

22. Wood Pulp I at 11,547-12. The nature of the production of paper products requires that
manufactures rely on one type or grade of pulp for production purposes. Switching companies and
thus grades can be done. However, the process is costly and time consuming. Accordingly,
manufacturers were essentially limited to their current suppliers. Id.
23. Wood Pulp II at 915. See Treaty at art. 85.
24. Id. at 942.
25. Id.
26. See id at 915-16.
27. Wood Pulp I at 11,547-23-24. The Commission expressly extended jurisdiction in this case
to cover violations of Article 85(1).
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EEC' and that "the concertation on prices, the exchange of
sensitive information relative to prices, and the clauses prohibiting
export or resale all concerned shipments made directly to buyers in
'
The
the EEC or sales made in the EEC to buyers there." 29
Commission focused on shipments coming into the Community as
the requisite effect triggering Article 85(1).
Based on the above analysis, the Commission found that the
producers violated Article 85(1) "since they knowingly and
deliberately concerted with regard to their announced transaction
prices, exchanged . .. information . . .which was relevant to
competition, and arranged for export and re-sale bans, thereby
affecting trades within the Member States."" In Wood Pulp I, the
Commission's expression of the scope of Community law was
broad indeed: "Community law covers any agreement or any
practice which is capable . . . [of] affecting the structure of
competition within the Common Market."'" It would have been
difficult for the ECJ to have affirmed such a broad expression of
authority in its 1988 decision, Wood Pulp HI.
The Commission's decision to extend jurisdiction was based on
explicit findings that "the effect of the agreements and practices
[charged to customers] within the EEC was therefore not only
substantial but intended, and was the primary and intended result32
of the agreements and practices." 33 Once the Commission
concluded that the anti-competitive conduct was intentional and had
indeed occurred in violation of Article 85(1), the Commission then

28. Id. at 11,547-24.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 11,547-34.
31. Id. at 11,547-32-33. Here the Commission was relying on Hugin v. Comm n to justify such
an expansive statement of the scope of community jurisdiction. [1979] E. Comm. Ct. J.Rep. 1869,
[1979] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 345.
32. The Commission conducted an exhaustive investigation which is contained in the
Commission's Report. See Wood Pulp I, supra note 12.
The Commission's conclusions that the resulting anti-competitive effects experienced in the EEC
were violative of the treaty were based on oral and written correspondences between the producers.
Further, the Commission analyzed the economic outcome of the price quotations coupled with market
conditions to determine that the outcome was not by chance but was rather controlled and intended.
See generally id. at 11,547-24-11,547-30.
33. Id. at 11,547-24.
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proceeded to impose fines based on the individual actor's
participation.
The producers and the two trade associations were all registered
outside the Community' and appealed36 the Commission's
decision to the European Court of Justice after the Commission
levied fines37 in excess of four million ECU against "36 of the 43
addressees of [their] decision including Fincell and KEA." 38 The
fines39 were based on the Commission's conclusion that anticompetitive practices had occurred within the EEC in violation of
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty.'
(b)

Issues on Appeal

The ECJ collectively listed issues presented by the producers
and cartels for its consideration: 4' 1) Does the earlier Dyestuffs
decision preclude the extension of territorial jurisdiction over
undertakings outside the Community except when activity occurs
through a subsidiary or agent of an undertaking performed within
the EEC; 2) whether international law precludes the Commission's
extension of jurisdiction based on competition outside the EEC
with mere repercussions within the EEC; 2 3) whether the Finnish

34. See id. at 11,547-24-27.
35. Wood Pulp 1I at 938.
36. The appeal was brought in connection with Article 173(2) of the Treaty to vacate the earlier
Commission with respect to its assertion of jurisdiction under Article 85(1) and the fines that were
imposed. Id.
37. In Wood Pulp I, fines totalled in excess of 4 million ECU. For specific allocations among
undertakings, see Wood Pulp I at 11,547-37.
38. Wood Pulp 11 at 907.
39. Under Article 15(2)(a) of Regulation No. 17, the Commission may by decision impose on
undertakings fines of from one thousand to one million ECU, or in some excess thereof but not
exceeding 10 percent of the turnover in the preceding business year of each of the undertakings
participating in the infringement where, either intentionally or negligently, they infringe Article 85(1).
Wood Pulp I at 11,547-34.
40. Wood Pulp If at 907. Note that appeal was taken to the European Court of Justice via
Article 173(2) of the Treaty after a hostile decision by the Commission.
41. Wood Pulp If at 912-13. The author has restated all the claims into five clear statements
of the issues presented.
42. Id. at 939-40.
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addressees contentions that the Free Trade Agreement43 enacted
between Finland and the Community precludes the Commission's
application of Article 85(1) of the Treaty; 4) whether KEA should
be immune from jurisdiction based on the non-interference
principle with respect to the Webb-Pomerene Act." The ECJ
addressed all these issues in its 1989 decision, Wood Pulp II. For
the purposes of its decision, the Court assumed all the factual
findings obtained by the Commission in Wood Pulp L45 In its
decision, the Court was aided by a persuasive opinion by an
Advocate General, M. Marco Darmon. Further, the ECJ in an
attempt to better clarify the jurisdictional issues, submitted several
questions to the Commission."
B. Commission'sAnalysis in 1988 Wood Pulp II
1. Question Posed by the ECJ on Appeal
The Commission's analysis began with an answer to several
questions posed by the ECJ. The first question simply asked the
Commission to clarify what type of conduct is required and where
does the conduct have to occur in order to trigger Community
jurisdiction. '7 The Commission begins by referring to Article 3(f)
of the Treaty, which notes the objective of the Community,
''economic activity within the Community should not be
distorted." ' "4 The Commission contended that the above rationale
justifies the broad interpretation of effects within the Community.

43. See Agreement Between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Finland,
Nov. 22, 1973, European Economic Community - Finland, OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 328) 28.11.
(1973) [hereinafter FTA].
44. Wood Pulp 11 at 940. The United Kingdom also intervened on behalf of KEA with respect
to this jurisdictional issue. The U.K.'s argument against the assertion ofjurisdiction will be analyzed
infra at notes 158-71.
45. Wood Pulp II at 940.
46. See infra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
47. The question was: Does the Commission maintain that it has jurisdiction in these cases
by reason of conduct which has taken place within the Community and, if so, what is that conduct?
Or does it base its
jurisdiction on the effects within the Community of conduct which took place
outside the Community and, if so, what is the conduct and what are its effects? Wood Pulp II at 914.
48. Id.
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Second, the Commission responded that the relevant focus for
determining what conduct triggers Article 85 of the Treaty is the
implementation of such a concerted practice, agreement or
decision. ' The Commission continued by noting three corollaries
to the above proposition. First, for the purposes of jurisdiction, the
relevant conduct must be where the effect or object of an
agreement occurred and not where the agreement was formed."
Second, relevant conduct includes that of an undertaking's
subsidiaries or agents." Third, the conduct by each party in a
concerted practice indicates that a requisite effect was intended. 2
In Wood Pulp II, the ECJ began by discussing the difficulty in
distinguishing the effects of conduct from the conduct itself. 3 In
doing so, the Court noted the Commission's attempt to define
effects as "the direct and perceivable consequences of certain
conduct."'
However, the ECJ went on to expound that the
distinction is clarified when conduct that distorts competition
within the Community is contrasted with conduct that does not
itself produce distortion, but rather its effect within the Community
is distortion.55 In other words, the rationale for effects jurisdiction
is enhanced by analyzing the end effect and tracing its cause rather
than beginning with the cause and then attempting to trace the
effects occurring within the Community.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. This would seem to extend the first focus by including the relevant conduct of the agent
or subsidiaries acting within the Community.
52. Id
53. Wood Pulp H at 914.
54. Id.
55. Id This author believes that "effects" jurisdiction was adopted by the ECJ in Wood Pulp
If. However, the ECJ does validate the Commission's extension of jurisdiction without using express
language adopting the "effects" doctrine. Due to the ECJ's failure to use this language, some
believe that the Court only redefined producer conduct in order to allow for jurisdiction under the
Treaty in this case alone. By doing this, some argue that the ECJ has not expressly adopted the
.effects" doctrine.
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2. Specific Conduct Violating the Treaty
Specifically, the ECJ noted the Commission's conclusions with
respect to the conduct in violation of Article 85(1). First, the
announcement of prices by producers was made in the Community
and the actual prices were then utilized by either the producers
themselves or some other agent. 6 This is the conduct that the
Commission argues took place within the Community. The
Commission contends that this was the conduct producing a
"substantial,
foreseeable and direct effect within the
Community. '5 7 The illustrated effect was then a restriction on
competition within the Common Market. 8
Further, the Commission argues that the KEA cartel was
responsible for promulgating "concerted practices on prices'' 9
and strengthening the position of its members that ultimately led to
the conduct of the producers and their agents.' The Commission
argued that while KEA did not sell wood pulp or maintain offices
within the EEC, the cartel did produce "effects" through the
concertation of prices within the EEC sufficient to justify
jurisdiction for violations of Article 85 of the Treaty. 1
The Commission attempted to avoid the major hurdles of
"effects" jurisdiction arguing that the conduct in question actually
occurred within the Community.' Accordingly, the Commission
argued that international law is not violated when the Community
is not attempting to regulate conduct outside its borders. The
56. Id.
57. Id. at 915.
58. Wood Pulp II at 915.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. This is accomplished by focusing on the conduct of the KEA members. The Commission
argued that the Cartel's activities directed the producers to charge the concerted prices within the
EEC. Thus, the activity by the individual producers could then be attributed to the Cartel whose
conduct did occur outside the Community.
62. ld at 915.
63. Only exercises of jurisdiction by a state outside its territorial boundary requires a
specifically permissive rule of international law. Wood Pulp I1 at 915. Based on this analysis, the
only effects produced within the Community would be those sales by producers attributable to the
Cartel's activities. In arguing the Commission's jurisdiction over this effect, the debate centers on
the practices of other states within the Community and the argument that the EEC's jurisdictional
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Commission continued to justify jurisdiction based on the intended,
direct and substantial effects which were actually produced within
the Common Market. ' Thus, the Commission argued that it had
not violated any international doctrines by sanctioning only that
conduct occurring within the Community. '
In Wood Pulp H1, the Commission contends that all the conduct
occurred within the community. The Commission could conclude
that these producers were not outside the jurisdiction of the
Community, although their headquarters were based outside the
EEC.' The Commission points to the language in Article 85 of
the Treaty dealing with restrictive practices that expressly uses the
word "any" to modify conduct allowing for jurisdiction over anticompetitive conduct affecting the member states.' Accordingly,
the Commission argues that the jurisdiction over producers
maintaining offices outside the Community as well as KEA and
Fincell was allowable under the Treaty and not violative of
international laws.
C. The Advocate General's Opinion in Wood Pulp II
The Advocate General's opinion was given by M. Marco
Darmon. He began by restating the issue raised by the addressees
on appeal:
Neither Community Law nor international law authorizes the application
of the Community competition rules to undertakings established outside
the Community solely by the reason of the effects produced within the

Community."
The Advocate General continued by addressing six areas of focus.
First, the existence of "effects" doctrine jurisdiction in light of

limits are dictated by those of its member states. Id.
64. Id. at 916.
65. Id. at 914.
66. Wood Pulp I at 11,547-24.
67. The author is not sure whether the intent of the drafters was to provide a vehicle whereby
the Commission would be capable of utilizing -effects" doctrine jurisdiction. Instead, the term
.any" may have simply been a word inserted into the Treaty which could be limited by later
amendments or judicial interpretation.
68. Wood Pulp 1I at 917.
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Community law.' This is accomplished by analyzing the relevant
passages from Article 85 in addition to Community case law on the
topic.7" Second, he considers the "effects" doctrine in light of
international law.7 Third, he examines the principles behind
"effects" jurisdiction within the United States.'
Fourth, the
Advocate General suggests a criterion for the exercise of "effects"
jurisdiction by the Community.3 Fifth, the matter concerning the
KEA cartel is analyzed.74 Finally, the Advocate General
examined the Finnish concerns and the Fincell argument that the
FTA precludes enforcement under Article 85 of the Treaty."
Accordingly, the following discussion begins with the Advocate
General's analysis of "effects" jurisdiction with respect to
Community law.
1. The Effects Doctrine With Respect to Community Law
The Advocate General begins his analysis by examining the
addressees two main objections. First, nothing in the language of
Article 85 should be construed as granting jurisdiction over
undertakings established outside the Community solely on
"effects" produced within the Community.'
Second, the
addressees argued that prior case law produced by ECJ rejected the
existence of "effects" doctrine jurisdiction."
The Advocate
General rejected both of these objections raised by the addressees.
However, in his decision, the Advocate General also recommends
to the Court that it not follow the Commission's recommendations.
The Advocate General explored the essence of the wording of
the Treaty and specifically Article 85 reflecting the idea that
Community competition law is applicable whenever anti-

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
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See id. at 917-20.
Id. at 918-20.
Id. at 920-24.
Id. at 924-28.
Wood Pulp II at 928-32.
Id. at 932-34.
Id. at 934-38.
Id at 918.
Id.
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competitive effects are produced within the Community.'
Commentators have noted that the relevant focus for the above
proposition is the location of effects which were the object of the
anti-competitive conduct.79 Accordingly, the Advocate General
interprets the scope of the Community's jurisdiction as including
"any" effects produced within the Community which effect the
Common Market.
The Advocate General continued by recognizing that the ECJ
had never formally adopted "effects" jurisdiction; even though, the
Court had never formally rejected it either.8" Dyestuffs has been
commonly cited for the proposition that the ECJ had rejected
"effects" jurisdiction.81 In Dyestuffs, the Advocate General, A.G.
Mayras, argued for the adoption of a "qualified effects" test in
order to provide jurisdiction over undertakings outside the
Community." However, the court expressed a more traditional
"unity of undertaking" approach. The Advocate General clarified
that the ECJ's silence in its Dyestuffs decision as to "effects"
jurisdiction should not be considered a rejection of the doctrine."
Another case cited as justification for "effects" jurisdiction is
Walrave v. Union Cycliste International." While the case focused
on the existence of legal relationships, the Court did analyze the
existence of relationships by "reason either of the place where they
were entered into or the place where they take effect.... "

Thus, while the ECJ has never formally adopted "effects"
jurisdiction as evidenced by Dyestuffs, the Advocate General

78. Wood Pulp If at 918. The Advocate General continues by noting it is agreements, decisions,
and concerted practices which have as their effect the restriction or distortion of competition within
the Common Market. Id.
79. The Advocate General cites many scholarly articles in support of this point.
80. Id. at 918-19.
81. Id.
82. Id. For a detailed discussion of the Advocate General Mayra's opinion in Dyestuffs, see
infra notes 150-57 and accompanying text (analyzing Dyestuffs).
83. This author believes that the court knew that use of 'effects- jurisdiction by the
Community might not be well received in the international economic community. Thus, it waited
16 years for an obvious factual need for the "effects" jurisdiction. The situation presented itself in
Wood Pulp because a majority of the undertakings have no other conduct within the Community.
84. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1405, [1975] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 277 [hereinafter Walrave].
85. Wood Pulp II at 919.
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believed that the Court would not hesitate to endorse the
doctrine.86
2. The Effects Doctrine and InternationalLaw
Traditionally, state jurisdiction is based on either nationality,
jurisdiction over nationals of a state, or territoriality, where the
event in question takes place within the borders of the state. 7 The
Advocate General explained that there are two distinct and
recognized applications of territoriality: subjective and objective.88
The Advocate General defines subjective territoriality as permitting
a state to deal with acts which originated within its territory, even
though they were completed abroad.
Conversely, objective
territoriality, permits a state to deal with acts originating abroad but
which were completed, at least in part, within its territory. 8 It is
objective territoriality and not subjective territoriality from which
"effects" doctrine jurisdiction flows. Jurisdiction based on
objective territoriality has had an important impact on a state's
ability to control conduct outside its borders.'
Accordingly,
objective territoriality has been useful to states seeking jurisdiction
when effects are produced within the state from conduct occurring
outside its borders."

86. Id. at 920. Here, the Advocate General assumed transposing the analysis of legal
relationships to that of competition law would not be a problem.
87. The Advocate General cites Higgins, The Legal Basis ofJurisdictionIn Olmstead, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO, (1984). For the purposes of this
note, the focus will be on territoriality.
88. Wood Pulp I at 920.
89. Id.
90. Id. The classic example of objective territorial jurisdiction is the transnational murder.
When a person fires a gun from one state into another, the state with the dead citizen is thought to
have jurisdiction over the act. The conduct, ruing the gun, was then completed when the bullet hit
its target in the affected state. This obvious result becomes less obvious when the conduct focused
on changes from the act of firing the gun to the conduct of the gun shop for selling the gun in the
frst place. The argument being that it was the conduct of selling the gun which allowed the harmful
conduct of the user to produce effects within the affected state. It is this extension with respect to
relevant conduct which is of particular concern in the area of anti-competitive conduct and why
traditionally, objective territoriality jurisdiction has been limited to criminal conduct.
91. Id. at 920.
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The problem of asserting "effects" jurisdiction in the context
of international law is one of location. If "effects" jurisdiction is
defined as power over activity within a state's own borders, then
the sovereignty of that state justifies its actions. However, if
"effects" jurisdiction is defined as exbrcise of jurisdiction over
activity outside the asserting state's borders, then a state seeking to
exercise such jurisdiction must be able to point to a permissive rule
of international law.'
(a)

InternationalCase Law

In Lotus," the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)
noted that international law allows a state to exercise jurisdiction
over conduct outside its borders despite the absence of a permissive
rule of international law.' The ability to exercise jurisdiction over
conduct outside its borders would only be limited by issues of
sovereignty." The PCIJ then concluded that artificial restrictions
to sovereignty (permissive rules of international law) cannot be
presumed.'
In Barcelona Traction,' the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) sought to clarify previous interpretations of the earlier Lotus
decision. The Court stated that there were limits to assertions of
jurisdiction when such jurisdiction 'is more reasonably or
appropriately exercised by another state." The Court's analysis
focused on the inseparability of the relevant acts and the correlative
effects produced within the particular state.9 With respect to anticompetition violations of Article 85, the Advocate General
concluded in Barcelona that the effect, prevention, restriction, or

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 921.'
1927 P.C.IJ. (ser. A) No. 10 [hereinafter Lotus].
Lotus at 19.
Id.
Id. at 18.
[1970] 1.CJ. Rep. 65.
Id. at 105.
Wood Pul at 922.
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distortion of the Common Market should be considered a
constituent element."re
(b)

Conflicts of Community Effects Jurisdiction With
InternationalLaw

Writers analyzing Lotus and Barcelonahave concluded that the
location of effects within the asserting state is a valid basis for
jurisdiction under international law."' The Advocate General
based his analysis on the assumption that justified assertions of
jurisdiction by Member States validate the Community's use of
similar doctrines."r° Based on the above conclusions, the issue
arises whether the Community's power to enforce fines levied by
the Commission is prescriptive or enforcement jurisdiction."r° The
Advocate General concluded that the Community's attempt to
enforce fines levied by the Commission in Wood Pulp I was
analogous to prescriptive jurisdiction.'"
3. Principles of United States Case Law
The United States began its development of jurisdictional
analysis with the basic premise stated by Oliver Wendell Holmes
in 1909, "[AII legislation is primarily territorial."'" However,
the Advocate General pointed out that it was not until 1945, in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),"° that the
U.S. gave a clear expression of the "effects" - doctrine
jurisdiction."° The case involved the violation of U.S. antitrust

100. Id.
101. Id. at 923.
102. Wood Pulp II at 923.

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
American Banana v. United Fruit, 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter Alcoa].

107. This signalled the rejection of American Bananaand the beginning of 'effects" jurisdiction
within the U.S. But cf.Kelso, Review of the Supreme Court's 1989-90 Term and Preview of the
1990-91 Term for the Transnational Practitioner, 3 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 4-13 (1990) (indicating that

the United States Supreme Court in Burnham v. Superior Court of California appears to be reverting
back to the 19th century, Holmes-type approach); Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 110 S.
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legislation."ir
In Judge Learned Hand's opinion, the court
recognized that the U.S. was capable of legislating rules to govern
conduct outside this country producing effects within the borders
of the U.S.' 9
(a)

The Judiciary's Approach to Effects Doctrine
Jurisdiction

The United States' utilization of "effects" doctrine jurisdiction
was both a necessary and foreseeable development, similar to that
of the EEC. However, the EEC's entrance into the "effects"
jurisdiction arena is softened by the fact that the U.S. has already
extended "effects" jurisdiction to non-criminal cases. The EEC
also will benefit from the refinement of the assertion of such
jurisdiction, learning from its successes and failures.
In 1945, Judge Hand set down the traditional "intended
effects" test in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America."'°
Judge Hand determined that U.S. antitrust legislation was intended
to be, and was capable of being, utilized to control foreign business
activity intending to and affecting domestic economic activity
within the U.S."'
The U.S. added a reasonableness standard in Timberlane
Lumber v. Bank of America"' to be applied by courts in asserting
jurisdiction. In Timberlane, one federal appellate court, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals liberalized the original standard in Alcoa
by creating a three part weighing or balancing test to be applied by
a court in determining whether to assert jurisdiction based on the

Ct. 2105 (1990).
108. For a more detailed discussion of the Alcoa decision and its ramifications, see infia notes
110-29 and accompanying text.
109. Wood Pulp H1at 925.
110. 148 F.2d 416, 443-45 (2d Cir. 1945).
111. A stricter view was adopted in 1951 requiring a direct and influencing effect on trade. See,
e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
112. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985) [hereinafter Timberlane].
Timberlane alleged that Bank of America had conspired to prevent it from milling and exporting
Honduran lumber to the United States. The district court dismissed Timberlane's complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals vacated the dismissal and remanded for
reconsideration on the issue of jurisdiction in light of international comity and fairness. Id. at 615.
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"effects" doctrine. The Alcoa court noted the need for other
courts asserting "effects" doctrine jurisdiction to go beyond simply
determining whether or not a "direct and substantial impact"
occurred upon American commerce."'
Factors considered in
asserting "effects" jurisdiction are: 1) Degree of conflict with
foreign law; 2) place of business or nationality of the party; 3)
degree with which enforcement can be expected; 4) relative
significance of effects in the U.S. with respect to elsewhere in the
world; 5) existence of a specific purpose to harm or affect
American commerce; 6) foreseeability of such an event; 7) relative
importance of violations within the U.S. as compared to conduct
abroad."4 The court utilized these factors in determining when to
assert jurisdiction even after the ",effects" of any unlawful action
have already been determined."'
Two years after the Timberlane decision, the Third Circuit
attempted to answer problems faced by courts in applying the
Timberlane factors in Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp."6
The court in Mannington found the Timberlane decision incomplete
and unworkable for courts wrestling with theproblem of asserting
"effects" jurisdiction. The court decided three additional factors
were necessary to make the Timberlane decision-making criterion
workable. First, is there currently pending litigation somewhere
else? Second, a court should determine the existence of an
antitrust treaty applicable to the activity. Third, can the court point
to some form of inconsistent behavior in justifying its assertion of
jurisdiction?"7 The court in Mannington believed these factors
were necessarily added to the other factors in order to further

113. Id.
114. Id. at 614. The court determined these factors by analyzing two other sources. See
RESTATEMENT (SECoND) oF FoREIGN RE.ATioNs LAW Op THE UNITED STATES (1985) at §40
[hereinafter RESTATEmENT]; see also, K. BREWSTm, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESs ABROAD
(1958). See generally Beausang, The ExtraterritorialJurisdictionof the Sherman Act, 70 DicK. L
REV. 187 (1966); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws
Approach; 28 STAN. L REv. 1005 (1976); Note, ExtraterritorialApplicationof the Antitrust Laws;
A Conflict of Laws Approach, 70 YALE UJ. 259 (1960) (analyzing the connection between the
Sherman Act and "effects" jurisdiction).
115. Timberlane at 614.
116. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) [hereinafter Mannington].
117. Id. at 1297-98.
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legitimize judicial exercises of "effects" jurisdiction with respect
11
to comity. 8
The U.S. faced a similar situation to the Wood Pulp scenario in
Daishowa International v. North Coast Export."9 In Daishowa,
both parties were wood chip manufacturers. The suit was based on
the Webb-Pomerene Act 2" that provides associations involved
purely in the export trade with an exception to registration under
the Sherman Antitrust regulation. The issue presented to the court
was whether the U.S. courts were capable of using the Sherman
Antitrust Act to obtain jurisdiction over foreign corporations
producing effects within the U.S.'
The court combined the Timberlane and Mannington tests,
concluding that the Japanese corporation did not receive reciprocal
protection to the antitrust laws of the U.S." But the Daishowa
court did not stop there, the court extended the effects principle
with respect to comity considerations, noting that "United States
courts may exercise jurisdiction whenever there is any effect on
United States commerce.'"
In 1982, the Fifth Circuit also faced the problem of resolving
Timberlane and Mannington in IndustrialInvestment Development
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co." Here, an American corporation and its
two Hong Kong subsidiaries"z sued an Indonesian corporation
alleging a conspiracy to keep IIDC out of the Indonesian lumber
business by interfering with the contract rights of the U.S.
corporation with interests in Indonesia.26 Mitsui argued that U.S.
commerce was not affected because prior to the attempted entry
into the Indonesian lumber market by Industrial Investment, all the

118. Note, Reasonablenessas a Limit to ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,
62 WASH, U.L.Q. 681,683

(1985).
119. 1982-2 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 64,774 (N.D. Cal. 1982) [hereinafter Daishowa].
120. Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1988).
121. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988) (Sherman Antitrust Act); id. §§ 12-27 (1988)
(Clayton Act)(a 1914 amendment to the Sherman Antitrust Act).
122. The court in Daishowa was unable to apply the comity factors laid down in Timberlane
evidenced by the Daishowa court's expansive holding.
123. Daishowa at 71,788.
124. 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Mitsui].
125. International Investment Development Corp. [hereinafter IIDC].
126. Mitsui at 881.
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lumber in question was currently being shipped to Japan. 7
Nevertheless, the court after looking at the activities in Indonesia
alone, concluded there would be no effect on U.S. commerce.'
However, the court continued to say that any overt anti-competitive
activities committed against U.S. corporations abroad does have an
effect on domestic U.S. commerce through its negative effect on
the individual corporation.'
The extension of "effects" doctrine jurisdiction in Mitsui
extends the ability of U.S. courts to address any anti-competitive
acts committed by foreign corporations upon the United States.
The Fifth Circuit's identification of "effects" or, injury to an
American corporation, seems limitless. Given this extreme
application, one might wonder what course of action, if any, the
Fifth Circuit may take in the future to limit extensions of "effects"
jurisdiction for such singular activity.
(b)

The Restatement of ForeignRelations and "Effects"
Doctrine Jurisdiction

The Restatement (Second) of Foreign relations Law of the
United States was formerly adopted in the United States as a model
analysis for the assertion of "effects" doctrine jurisdiction. ' "
The two major concerns visible throughout much of the U.S.
legislation on the topic of "effects" jurisdiction, comity and
reasonableness, generally have been adopted by most courts in the
United States.' 3' The first consideration underlying any test
created for "effects" jurisdiction is "reasonableness." The
problem, however, has been that courts have been unable to find a
3
workable test that can be applied to more than one case. .
Second, the courts also must consider notions of international
127. Id. at 883-84. Here, Mitsui contended that the Sherman Act was inapplicable because all
the lumber in question was destined for Japan and would not have made it to the U.S.
128. Mitsui at 884.
129. Id.

130. See

RESTATEMENT,

supra note 114, at § 40.

131. Note that Mitsuiserves as an exception to this rule with an almost limitless application of
"'effects" doctrine jurisdiction.
132. See supra notes 110-29 and accompanying text.
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comity. Respecting foreign law while attempting to exercise
jurisdiction over activity of foreign corporations has presented a
rather grave problem for judiciaries." In 1985, the Restatement
was adopted to provide some guidelines for courts to follow.
The Restatement concentrated on three basic factors. First,
conduct and its correlative effect must be constituent elements such
that the effect was foreseeable or intended in the plan or
Second, the effect within the U.S. must be
scheme."
"substantial."" 3 Third, there must be an intended and primarily
intended result." The factors listed in the Restatement can be
found to be derived from prior case law. 3 However, these are
essentially the same criterion the courts have struggled with in tie
Therefore, it is difficult to understand how the
past. 3 8
Restatement will offer much help to the courts, except by providing
such general criterion that courts may avoid future conflicts like
those present in Daishowa.
4. The Advocate General's Suggested Criterionin Wood Pulp
I[
(a)

Suggested Approaches

The Advocate General began in Wood Pulp II by recognizing
three approaches suggested through commentary by writers on the

133. The problem arises when some courts confuse the "cffects" with international comity
issues. That an effect occurred on U.S. commerce should be independent of considerations of comity.
Unfortunately, courts have limited their analysis solely to the existence of effects. See generally,
Indus. Inv. Dev. v. Mitsui 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982). Here, the court remanded because the lower
court failed to address other issues besides the existence of -effects.134. See infra notes 150-57 and 203-20 and accompanying text (analyzing Dyestuffs); see also
RESTAiEMENT, supra note 114, at § 40.
135. The problem here has been that courts have had a hard time defining what is required to
meet the substantial requirement in the Restatement. Unfortunately, the comments on this element
are not very illuminating.
136. RE TATEMENT, supra note 114, at § 40.
137. See generally Tunberlane; Mannington; supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text
(discussing the application of "effects" jurisdiction).
138. See T7nberlane factors.
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subject of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 39 The first approach,
proffered by Professor Jennings, expressed the idea that all
extraterritorial jurisdiction is valid for legitimate purposes, so long
The second
as the use of such jurisdiction is not abused."
approach, provided by Professor Mann, argued that a state's
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction must be "fair and
reasonable."'" To produce such an outcome, Professor Mann
advocates the "closeness of connection test:"
[A] state has legislative jurisdiction, if its contact with a given set of
facts is so close, so substantial, so direct, so weighty, that legislation in

respect of them is in harmony with international law and its various
aspects (including the practices of states, the principles of noninterference and reciprocity and the demands of interdependence)."

A third approach suggested by other writers is that of the "primary
effect."'' This test is satisfied when the primary effect produced
within the asserting state is "more direct and more substantial than
The Advocate General
that produced in other states."'"
concluded that the above approaches to "effects" jurisdiction all
contain elements of reasonableness and necessarily include respect
of sovereignty.
The Advocate General prefaced his comments when he noted
that the showing of "effects" in the above approaches may be
different than the concept of effects contained within Article 85.'"
The term "effects" has been interpreted by scholars as having two
essential elements with respect to Community law. First, the effect
produced within the Community must be "perceptible"" or
"appreciable."' 47 Second, the effect must be either direct or

139. See generally Wood Pulp!! at 928-30 (discussing suggested approaches to the "effectS"
doctrine).
140. Id. at 929.
141. Id.
142. Mann, The Doctrineof Jurisdictionin InternationalLaw, [1964] R.C.A.D.I. 7,49 (quoted
in Wood Pulp II at 929).
143. See Wood Pulp II at 929.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 930.
146. J. Megret, J. V. Louis, D. Vignes & M. Waelbrock, LE DROrr DE LA COMMUNAUTE
ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE, (1972), 4 Concurrence at 20 (cited in Wood Pulp Ii at 930).
147. Id. at 21.
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indirect and either objectively or reasonably foreseeable."4
However, he rejects the above tests as too expansive with respect
to "indirect effects" in favor of the "qualified effects" test.' 9
(b)

The Qualifled Effects Test

In Dyestuffs, the Advocate General, Mayras, defined "effects"
as the "direct and immediate, reasonably foreseeable and
substantial effect,'" produced within the Community.
The
Advocate General, Darmon, in Wood Pulp II suggests that the ECJ
adopt the test offered in 1972 by former Advocate General
Mayras."I The "qualified effects" test has been substantively
adopted by other entities asserting "effects" jurisdiction. 52' As
an example, the Advocate General refers to the U.S. model for the
assertion of "effects"
jurisdiction contained within the
Restatement"' which contains
similar language to that of the
"qualified effects" test15
The Restatement parallels the "qualified effects" test espoused
in Dyestuffs. Article 5 of the Restatement asserts that a state can
extend jurisdiction when conduct outside its borders produces
effects within its borders, provided three conditions are met:
1) The conduct and its effect are constituent elements of a
restrictive practice;
2) The effect within the territory is substantial; and
3) The effect occurs as a direct and primarily intended result of the
conduct outside the territory.'

These criterion also have been referred to simply as the direct,
substantial, and foreseeable effect.

148. B. GOUMAN & A. LYON-CAN, DROU CoMmmcIAL EuRoPEN 551 (Dalloz, 4th ed.)
(cited in Wood Pulp II at 930).
149. Wood Pulp 1/ at 930.
150. [1972] E.C.R. 619,694, [1972] Comm. Mkt. LR. 557,604 (cited in Wood Pulp /Hat931).
151. Wood Pulp! 1at 931.
152. Id.
153. See RESTATEMNT, supra note 114.
154. Id. In its 55th conference, the International Law Association uopted the qualified effects
doctrine instead of rejecting completely the concept of "effects" jurisdiction. Id.
155. See REsTATEMENT, supra note 114, at § 402.
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The Advocate General recommends that the above criterion be
adopted by the ECJ as an expression of.the criterion required for
the Community's assertion of "effects" jurisdiction.ss
The
Advocate General's recommendation to the Court is also based on
the "appropriateness" of the use of "effects" jurisdiction by the
37
Community in defending the Common Market.
5. The Advocate General'sPosition on Jurisdiction Over The
KEA
The Advocate General begins his analysis here in Wood Pulp
II by reviewing the conclusions stated by the Commission in their
1984 decision, Wood Pulp L
Specifically, the 1984
Commission alleged that the members of the KEA cartel made
price recommendations that were then followed by other members
of the cartel which in turn encouraged concertation of prices by
producers who were not members of the KEA cartel. This activity
allowed the KEA to serve as the structure in which the price
concertation was implemented by the producers of wood pulp. 59
Accordingly, the Advocate General ultimately concluded that the
KEA cartel falls within the scope of the "qualified effects"
doctrine.
The United Kingdom intervened on behalf of the KEA cartel
arguing that the Community should be prevented from asserting
jurisdiction over the KEA. The U.K. recognized only the territorial
application of "effects" jurisdiction. Whereby, jurisdiction is
exclusively permissible when the individual has some territorial
connection with the Community.t "° In Wood Pulp II, the KEA
cartel had no branches, subsidiaries, or agencies within the

156. See WoodtPulp Hat 932. Also implicit in the Advocate General's conclusion and expressly

stated in the text is that* 1) [n]o rule of international law prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction; and
2) that issues of international comity do not preclude the Community's use of "effects" doctrine
jurisdiction. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Wood Pulp I, supra note 12.

159. Wood Pulp H at 932.
160. Id. at 933.
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Community.16 However, the Advocate General disagreed with
the U.K. with respect to the singularity of the "effects" doctrine
application. The Community's assertion of jurisdiction is not
limited by its borders. Rather, jurisdiction is only limited by the
criterion contained in the "effects" doctrine.
The addressees argued that the KEA cartel did not, itself, trade
within the EEC." However, the Advocate General found this
reasoning unpersuasive, concluding that when an association's
members engage in anti-competitive conduct, while the association
itself does not, this does not insulate the association as an entity
from "effects" jurisdiction." In support of this conclusion, the
Advocate General relies on two recent ECJ decisions.'" In Van
Landewyck v. Commission,'" the Court attributed Article 85
violations to a non-profit organization which made binding anticompetitive recommendations to its members, " ... Article 85(1)
also applies to associations in so far as their own activities or those
of the undertakings belonging to them are calculated to produce the
results which it aims to suppress."" However, in Wood Pulp II,
the ECJ concluded the recommendations made by the KEA were
not binding upon its members.
The ECJ recently addressed the application of Article 85 to
recommendations that are not required to be followed by an
association's members."t Here, the Court concluded that even
when the recommendations made by an association to its members
are non-binding, the recommendations still trigger the anticompetition rules contained in Article 85.

161. Id.
162. Id. Note that this concept was the specific activity complained of by the Commission
which argued that the cartel's function constituted a violation of Article 85.
163. Id.
164. See Van Landewyck v. Comm'n, [1980] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3125, [1981] 3 Comm. Mkt.
LR. 134; see also, lazv. Comm'n, [1983] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3369, [1984] 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
276 (cited in Wood Pudp II at 933).
165. [1980] E.C.R. 3125, [1981] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 134.

166. Id.
167. See Verband Der Sachversicherer,[1988] 4 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 264.
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In Wood Pulp II, the Advocate General addresses KEA's
registration under the Webb-Pomerene Act" by reiterating the
general proposition that "effects" jurisdiction is not precluded by
the existence of concurrent jurisdiction." Further, it is pointed
out that the registration requirement under Webb-Pomerene does
not limit the cartel's ability to export goods from the U.S.17 The
Advocate General concluded his analysis by noting that the
permissive nature of registering cartels does not immunize those
cartels from states asserting jurisdiction over them when there are
substantial effects produced within that state.""
D. The European Court of Justice's Decision
1. The Court'sAnalysis of Infringements in Wood Pulp II
The Court in Wood Pulp II began by addressing the producer's
infringements"r recognized by the Commission in Wood Pulp
First, the Court notes the concertation on prices charged to
1 '3
Community customers by foreign producers." Second, the actual
transaction prices charged to purchasers within the Community
were examined for an effect in violation of the treaty.
Here,
the Court distinguished the two violations of Article 85. The first
focuses on violations occurring outside the territory of the
Community through price setting communications between
producers. The second focuses on conduct occurring inside the

168. Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1988).
169. See generallyWood Pulp Hat936 (containing the Advocate General's analysis of the effect
of the Webb-Pomerene Act on the Community's ability to assert "'effects" doctrine jurisdiction).
170. Wood Pulp 1 at 934.
171. Id. (citing Application of Competition Laws to Foreign Conduct: AppropriateResolution
ofJurisdictionalIssues, conference at Fordham Corporate Law Institute Oct. 3-4, 1985).
172. See generally Wood Pulp I; Treaty at arts. 1(1) and 2.
173. For the purposes of this note, the focus will be on those infringements relevant to the ECVs
adoption of "effects" jurisdiction. Accordingly, the analysis concerning Fincell and the Free Trade
Agreement are excluded.
174. Wood Pulp//at 938. Seesupranotes 12-46 and accompanying text (discussing WoodPulp
I and analyzing the Commission's findings regarding specific violations).
175. Wood Pulp I at 938.
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Community attributed to the actual act of selling at concerted
prices.
The Court with respect to the KEA cartel accepts the facts as
true when given by the Commission's decision in Wood Pulp L
Specifically, the Court notes the conduct of the KEA with respect
to the price recommendations made to its members."6 While the
recommendations were not mandatory, they were followed, creating
as its ultimate effect the concertation of prices within the
Community.
The Court recognized that all the addressees were either doing
business1" in the Community or exporting wood pulp directly to
The Court, moreover,
purchasers within the Community.
acknowledged that the concertation affected a "vast majority of the
sales of those undertakings to and in the Community.""'7 The
Court finally noted the Commissions conclusion that the
concertation occurring "within the EEC was not only substantial
but intended, and was the primary and direct result of the
'
agreements and practices.'" 79
2. The ECJ's Placement of Conduct
The ECJ began here by agreeing with the Commission's
assessment of the scope of Community jurisdiction for violations
of Article 85 of the Treaty.'" In justifying its conclusion, the
Court relies on the placement of conduct within the Community.
It concludes that there were actually two distinct areas of focus for
which the Community asserts "effects" jurisdiction. First, the
court concludes that the formation of the agreement to concert
prices within the Community was conduct occurring outside the
Community. However, the secondary and equally relevant conduct,
176. Id.
177. Business was conducted through subsidiaries, agencies, or other establishments within the

Community. Id. at 939.
178. Id. 60% of wood pulp purchased within'the Community was afccted by the concertation
in prices. Id. The Court's factual findings are based on the Commission's conclusions in Wood Pulp
L
179. Id.
180. Wood Pulp I at 939.

787

The TransnationalLawyer/ Vol. 3
consisted of actual sales made to producers within the Community,
this can be interpreted as the implementation of the plan to affect
the Common Market.'
The ECJ concluded that the decisive factor with respect to the
application of anti-competition rules contained in the Treaty is the
place where the anti-competitive conduct is implemented."
Accordingly, undertakings implementing anti-competitive conduct
within the Community will now be subject to "effects" jurisdiction
regardless of whether those undertakings have agents or maintain
subsidiaries within the Community.'83 In Wood Pulp II, the Court
concludes that it is immaterial how the undertakings implemented
their pricing scheme within the Community.'u Accordingly, once
the Commission showed the concertation scheme, the only
connection that a foreign undertaking need have with the
Community to trigger "effects" jurisdiction is that they actually
made sales within the Community.
Given the prior analysis by the Court in Wood Pulp II, the
Court concluded that the relevant conduct occurred within the
Community because sales were made by foreign producers to
purchasers within the Community. This is conduct which occurs
within the borders of the state, thus granting to that state the power
to legislate over them. Therefore, the Court concluded that there
simply was no violation of the international rule of law regarding
territoriality.
The Court agreed with the Commission's findings"' that
individual producers outside the Community did indeed take part
in concertation which had as its intended effect the restriction of
competition within the Common Market as defined in Article 85 of
the Treaty.'86 Accordingly, based on the Court's analysis of the

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See i.
Id.
Id. at 941.
Id.
For a detailed discussion, see Wood Pul I, supra note 12.
Wood Pulp H at 941.
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location of conduct, the Commission was correct in utilizing the
territorial scope of Article 85. 8
3. Jurisdiction Over the KEA Cartel
The Court, agreeing with both the Commission and the
Advocate General concluded no conflict existed between the
assertion 'of jurisdiction based on Article 85 violations and the
KEA's registration under the Webb-Pomerene Act.' The WebbPomerene Act only excludes cartels from registration under U.S.
law. The Court concludes that this in no way prevents the
Community's jurisdiction over the KEA.
The Court focused on several explicit facts to reach the
conclusion that KEA did not play a separate role in the
concertation of prices affecting the Common Market. First, the
Court notes that KEA is a non-profit organization whose purpose
is the promotion of the commercial interests of its members.'"
Second, the KEA consists of resident groups representing specified
interests within the pulp industry, and the only way to become an
individual member of the KEA is to belong to one of these groups.
Third, the bylaws of the KEA state that each group within the KEA
will enjoy full independence in the management of its affairs.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that because of the nature and
apparent independence of the cartel's members, the KEA's price
recommendations cannot be separated from those concluded by its
members. The KEA did not participate in the individual conduct
required for the Community's use of "effects" doctrine
jurisdiction. Based on the above analysis, the Court was compelled
to affirm the Commission's exercise of territorial jurisdiction under
Article 85 and to reverse the Commission's decision to assert
jurisdiction over the KEA cartel for lack of the requisite conduct
necessary to assert "effects" jurisdiction."

187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
For a more detailed discussion, see supra notes 158-71 and accompanying text.
Wood Pulp I1 at 942.
Id. at 944.
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III. FACTORS LEADiNG UP To WOOD PULP
A. HistoricalForces Behind The Creation of the EEC
The EEC was born out of economic conflicts that generally
were the result of two World Wars.19 ' The original concerns of
the EEC were largely economic in that it sought economic
stabilization and establishment of a common market that would
permit a balanced expansion of economic activities and a higher
standard of living within the member states." In order to carry
out these principles, decision-making power was shifted from the
member states to the Community.'93
Member states were
relegated to trustees of EEC policy acting only after consultation
and agreement by the Commission.'"
The creation of the European Court of Justice was a necessary
corollary to the creation of the Community in order to insure
compliance with directives1" from the legislative and policy
making body of the Community." The Court is empowered to
review Commission decisions to insure compliance with Treaty
directives and to insure that no abuse of Commission authority
exists.
The Treaty has been interpreted with great pliancy by
the ECJ to allow it to change with the times."
Customary
interpretation of the Treaty as well as policy directives adopted by

191. SLYNN, supra note 1. See Hoffman, The European Community and 1992, 68 FOREION
AFFAIRS 27 (Fall 1989).
192. See Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 2.
193. SLYNN, supra note 1, at 4.
194. 'Id. at 7. Internal policy is retained by the individual member states. However, many
decisions which seem to be inherently, internal have external ramifications and therefore come under
the purview of the Commission's authority.
195. In order to ensure compliance with the policies embodied by the Community, the
Community has power to issue directives to the member states requiring compliance, see Treaty,
supra note 1, at arts. 85-94.
196. SLYNN, supra note 1, at 4.
197. This was the means utilized by the producers of wood pulp to appeal from the
Commission's decisions, see Treaty, supra note 1, at arts. 173, 175.
198. SLYNN, supra note 1, at 5. Slynn notes that while the ECJ has used pliancy in interpreting
the Treaty, it also has continued to recognize longstanding beliefs held by individual member states.
Id. It is important here to point out the correlation to the United States Constitution with respect to
its interpretation.
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the EEC has led the Court, through interpretation of the Treaty, to
take a protective stance with respect to competition among the
member states and placing outside restrictions on the activities of
the various member states."9
The original purpose behind the EEC was the establishment of
an economic and political' entity capable of protectionist
activities enabling its individual members to expand their individual
economies for greater prosperity among Members participating in
the Common Market. However, the scope of the decision-making
power of the Court increased such that decisions concerning
individual transactions would extend over many different types of
activity involving similar transactions."' The ECJ must
continually balance the need to protect the free movement of goods
within the Community against the interests of the individual
member states. 2
B. The EEC's PriorExercise of Jurisdiction
1. Dyestuffs Case
In Dyestuffs,"°3 the ECJ faced the problem of defining the
extent of the Community's exercise of legitimate jurisdiction. The
Court recognized that it had two choices for defining the available
extent of jurisdiction exercisable by the Commission. First, it
could affirm jurisdiction based on activities by the parent
199. See Case 804179 Comm'n v. United Kingdom, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J 1045, [1981] 33
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 543. Here, the Court limited the power of the United Kingdom to regulate fishing
areas stating that all member states must be considered in actions even when there is no express
Community policy for the questioned activity.
200. There were other fundamental social aspects contained in the Treaty: Equal pay for equal
work, social law provisions, National's action against their respective member states, professional
freedom, social security and human rights. See generally SLYNN, supra note I (providing an
excellent description of the forces behind the creation of the EEC).
201. Id.
202. This usually has the effect of invalidating restrictive limitations imposed by member states
whenever actions would be contrary to EEC directives or implied policies as determined by the
Court.
203. See supra notes 150-57. For the purpose of examining the Dyestuffs cases, reference will
be made to Imperial Chem. Indus. v: Comm'n, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 619, [1971-1973 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8161.
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corporation sending communications to its subsidiaries maintained
within the EEC to establish the price for dyestuffs.20 ' Second, the
Court could recognize the Commission's assertion that jurisdiction
was justified under the "effects" doctrine where activity, via
concertation of prices, carried on outside the EEC affected the
Community's "common market." The Court ultimately concluded
that the Commission was justified in imposing fines based on the
first doctrine.
The Dyestuf-f case involved nine European manufacturers
registered in non-EEC countries involved in a price fixing
scheme.'
The Commission sought to impose fines on the
companies for their price-fixing scheme. The companies appealed
to the ECJ on the basis that the Commission did not have the
requisite jurisdiction to impose such fines."° The Court imposed
jurisdiction based on the subsidiaries within the EEC."°
However, the Court recognized that jurisdiction might be justified
solely due to "effects" produced within the European Economic
Community."a
While the use of such jurisdiction was
unnecessary in that case, the Court recognized a time might arise
in the near future when the Commission might assert its
jurisdiction based solely on the "effects" created within the
Community absent any explicit conduct performed by the parties
within the boundaries of the Community.'
The ECJ made a detailed analysis of the theoretical
underpinnings of "effects" jurisdiction and potential utilization by
the Community. The producers of dyestuffs, the appellants to the
ECJ, asked that the opinion of Professor Jennings be made part of
the record of the Court, thus requiring the Court to answer the

'204. The parent corporations maintained that sending telegrams to their subsidiaries in the EEC
was not sufficient conduct within the EEC for the purposes of activating Article 85. For a detailed
discussion'of this argument, see Imperial Chemical at 8009.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id
209. See Imperial Chemical at 8009.
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argument by Jennings against the extension of the "effects"
jurisdiction by the EEC."0
2. ProfessorJenning'sAnalysis
Professor Jenning's argument had two basic thrusts. First, he
argued that "an offense must be regarded as having been
committed within the national territory if one of the constituent
elements of the offense, and more specifically its effects, has taken
place there."" The classic "effects" doctrine jurisdiction had
been limited to criminal law violations where one of the constituent
elements was performed within the boundaries of the country
attempting to assert jurisdiction.
Not until 1945, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of Americd"'
did the U.S. seek to extend this form of jurisdiction to non-criminal
anti-trust cases establishing "objective territoriality" as a viable
jurisdictional alternative. The Court, extended the Lotus case to
non-criminal activity conducted outside the borders of the
complaining state, having adverse effects within its territorial
borders. At the time, many experts in the area of territoriality
believed that the class of offense to be included under a Lotus
rationale would only include those offenses that are generally
considered to be punishable under the criminal and civil laws of
the states having a well-developed legal system. " 3
Jenning's contention to the ECJ was that anti-competition laws
do not belong in the class of laws that would be accepted as
"punishable under criminal or civil law of states with well
developed legal systems." ' 4 Following the United States in
recognizing objective territoriality, the ECJ disagreed with
Jennings, but limited its acceptance of "effects" jurisdiction to

210. Id at 8005.
211. This was the basic test laid down in Lotus. Id.
212. United States v. Aluminum Co,of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
213. ImperialChemicalat 8005. This rationale would need to be quite malleable, changing with
the times, so that what was considered a violation included in this category would be determined by
surveying the laws of states having a well developed legal system at the time the violation took place.
214. Id.
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cases of "direct effects. 21 3 However, the Court did limit its
holding by noting that "effects" jurisdiction would only be
available when the individual member states did not maintain laws
which would invalidate "effects" jurisdiction over cartels. The
Court concluded in this instance that none of the member states
possessed laws which prevent the community from validly
exercising "effects" doctrine jurisdiction.t 6
In 1972 the Court's decision not to adopt "effects" jurisdiction
may have been influenced by the U.K.'s opposition. This factor
becomes significant considering the U.K.'s planned entry into the
Community the year following the Dyestuffs decision. Regardless
of the U.K.'s opposition to the "effects" doctrine, the Court may
have felt it had not yet amassed enough political and economic
clout to make the assertion of "effects" doctrine jurisdiction a
viable alternative. However, in 1988 the EEC exercised enough
economic and political power to legitimize its use of "effects"
jurisdiction.
The decision in Wood Pulp II represents the first time the
Commission asserted jurisdiction based solely on "effects"
doctrine jurisdiction."7 On appeal, there were three main issues
for the European Court of Justice to address. First, did the
Commission have the power to impose fines upon producers?
Second, can the EEC exert jurisdiction upon foreign corporations
with conduct complained of outside the EEC, but with its intended
effect within the EEC, and then apply its competition rules
contained in Articles 85 and 86 based upon stated jurisdiction

215. The Court recognized the Swiss court's interpretation of objective territoriality as also
including the "protection principle" allowing states to insure economic and social order within the
state free from interference. The Court further found that the above considerations were also
recognized in Lotus and were thus justified.
216. Id. at 8009. The U.K. did not become a member of the EEC until 1973 after the Court had

heard the case. Currently, the U.K. possesses reactionary laws commonly referred to as "blocking
statutes" designed to counter the extension of "effects" jurisdiction by the United States. See
Tittman, Extra-territorialApplication to U.S. Export ControlLaws on Foreign Subsidiariesof U.S.
Corporations: An American Lawyers View from Europe, 16 INT'L LAw. 730 (1982); see generally,
Comment, ExtraterritorialApplication ofthe AntitrustLaws and Retaliatory Legislationby Foreign
Countries, 11 GotDEN GATE U.L REv. 577 (1981).
217. Vollmer & Sandage, Casenote: The Wood Pulp Case, 23 INT'L LAw. 721 (1989).
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contained in the Treaty of Rome?" 8 Third, do the Articles of the
EEC provide the proper forum for which to impose fines rather
than the subsequently enacted Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
between Finland and the EEC?2 9 The Court answered all three
issues in the affmnative.'
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE EEC UTTIZING EFFECTS DOCTRINE
JURISDICTION

A. Problems With The Political Entity Aspect of "Effects"
Jurisdiction
Now that the EEC believes it is in a position to justify or
legitimize the use of "effects" jurisdiction, will it be able to
restrain the use of this doctrine? Restraint in this area is
paramount to the legitimacy of its use. The following analysis
points to the EEC's potential inability to properly confine the use
of "effects" jurisdiction.
Recall that the Court in Dyestuffs did not expressly adopt
"effects" doctrine jurisdiction. Rather the Court skirted the issue
by simply recognizing the potential use for the "effects" doctrine
and based jurisdiction on other grounds. At the time the Dyestuffs
cases were decided in 1972, the U.K. was not-yet a member of the
EEC. The U.K. joined the Community the following year.
However, at the time the Dyestuffs cases were decided,"1 the
United Kingdom had "blocking statutes" on its books in response

218. See Treaty, supra note 1.
219. This issue was specifically raised by Fincell which contended that the determination of any

improper conduct and any remedial actions should take place under the auspices of the FTA rather
than the Commission. Here the Court summarily concluded that concurrent jurisdiction existed
between the Articles and the subsequently executed FTA which provides sanctions for similar conduct
by offending producers located within the signing countries. Wood Pulp H at 935.
220. The second issue addressed by the Court examines the ability of the Commission to impose
fines based on perceived violations of the Articles. For the purposes of this note, the Commission's
ability to impose fines is assumed.
The third issue addressing the hierarchy between the EEC Articles and the FTA is not germane
to this discussion. For the purposes of this note, it is assumed that the Articles are the correct body
of law governing the Commission's decision to impose jurisdiction.
221. The Dyestuffs cases were decided between 1971-73. See supra note 2.
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to the United States codification of "effects" doctrine jurisdiction
in the Sherman Antitrust Act.'
It would have been difficult
indeed for the United Kingdom to join an economic body which
had just adopted a legal doctrine which the U.K. opposed.
In Wood Pulp II, the ECJ officially adopted "effects"
jurisdiction. On appeal, the U.K. expressed its disfavor as to the
use of "effects" jurisdiction and intervened on behalf of the KEA.
The U.K. argued against the application of the "effects" doctrine
with respect to the cartel on the basis of the acts committed by the
cartel's membership.'
The Court overturned the Commission's
original decision to extend jurisdiction over the cartel. In Wood
Pulp II, it appears that the Court backed down from the U.K.'s
challenge to its assertion of jurisdiction giving similar reasoning as
that given in Dyestuffs.' Given the obvious influence the U.K.
has previously enjoyed with respect to the use and adoption of this
doctrine, what can we expect from the ECJ as it attempts to utilize
this doctrine in the future?
The U.S. faced difficulties in utilizing "effects" jurisdiction
during the developmental stage of its case law.' The U.S.
eventually adopted a "qualified effects" test that was added to the
existing Timberlane factors. "6 The U.S. courts determined that
a "qualified effects" test was necessary in order to deal with the
issues of comity and concurrent jurisdiction that became problem
areas whenever the U.S. attempted an unqualified approach. "7
Comity considerations demand a balancing analysis which the
U.S. courts have struggled with when applying "effects" doctrine
jurisdiction. The question arises whether the Commission will
properly weigh asserting "competence" over only those cases
which would pass a comity considerations test within the U.S. The

222. See supra notes i19-21 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.

224. Recall in Dyestuffs, the Court believed that it could not expressly adopt "effects"
jurisdiction which also includes cartels the year before the U.K. was scheduled to join the
Community. See supra notes 150-57 and 203-20 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 105-29 and accompanying text.
226. Note these additional factors came after Timberlaneand were principly contained in Mitsui
and Daishowa,see supra notes 112-29 and accompanying text.
227. For a good discussion of this conversion by U.S. courts see Daishowa,supra note 119.
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ECJ has given the Commission broad discretionary "effects"
jurisdictionm similar to that enjoyed by U.S. courts in deciding
whether to assert jurisdiction. There is quite a difference between
the application of comity considerations by these two bodies. 9
Given the fact that the U.S. originally began using only an
unqualified approach, but later abandoned it for the qualified
approach, is it prudent for the Community to begin where the U.S.
began, rather than learning from the mistakes of over forty years
of caselaw? How long will it take the Community to re-evaluate
its decision and ultimately adopt a "qualified effects"' approach?
Further, the ECJ's vagueness concerning such a qualified test is
indeed troubling. The Commission is the investigative body and
the enforcing body of the articles contained in the EEC Treaty.
Accordingly, the ECJ should have given specific guidelines or
criterion to be utilized and followed by the Commission. One can
only conclude that the purpose for avoiding such a strict
delineation was that the ECJ was ensuring that it did not limit the
Commission thereby allowing the underlying precepts of the EEC
to continue. However, with the initial adoption of "effects"
doctrine jurisdiction, the obvious need for strict controls upon its
applications becomes evident. It will be interesting to see the
impartial application by the Commission of such a balancing test
in attempting to assert jurisdiction.'
B. Effects Jurisdictionas an Economic Weapon by the EEC
Finally, with the formal adoption of "effects" jurisdiction by
the EEC, the concern exists that the use of such jurisdiction would

228. Some argue that the ECY decision is not overly broad in that the Court adopts a lesser
standard than that urged by the Commission or the Advocate General. However, the only time
limitations will manifest themselves is on appeal to the ECJ and where that appeal results in a
reversal of a Commission decision.
229. This addresses the idea that the EEC may be incapable of utilizing "effects" doctrine
jurisdiction due to the different natures of the United States and the EEC's economic and political

mechanics.
230. Should the Commission exceed its authority, the affected party can always appeal to the
EC. However, after Wood Pulp II, this author wonders whether foreign corporations will be inclined
to attempt such a legal battle.
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be used for economic advantage rather than for true international
considerations. The EEC is in a unique position: the Commission,
armed with "effects" jurisdiction, is now capable of reaching more
actors than was once possible.' The decision making process of
dealing with improper conduct comes from the Commission. It is
'the Commission which conducts an investigation of the anticompetitive activity and then responds with some type of remedial
action.' The offending party would, of course, have the option
to appeal such a decision to the ECJ.
In Wood Pulp, the ECJ never questioned that in the aggregate,
the violative conduct's effect within the EEC was substantial.
However, should it be relevant that the individual judiciaries of the
member states within the Community might not have found an
effect great enough to assert jurisdiction, or that the measure of that
effect did not outweigh individual considerations of international
comity, preventing the assertion of jurisdiction? Accordingly,
conduct occurring within the borders of a member state, when
considered individually, may be construed as insignificant, but
when viewed in the totality as a Community, such inconsequential
conduct multiplied by the number of member states may subject an
undertaking to the Community's jurisdiction. The ECI's refusal to
adopt the "qualified effect" test, as proposed by the Advocate
Generals in both Dyestuffs and Wood Pulp, withholds the means to
temper the Community's perception of aggregate "effects."
The Commission could use the expanded power to affect
previously unattainable changes in the Common Market. The
intent of the Commission would never be an issue so long as there
was a recognizable effect under the test handed down by the ECJ
in Wood Pulp. Accordingly, while it would seem that the
Commission could address harms creating effects within the EEC,
its underlying motive could be strengthening the Community's

231. This, of course, assumes that the economic actors in some way violated one of the Articles

or engaged in some sort of illicit conduct.
232. The response referred to here has a wide range of possibilities. Usually, such anticompetitive activity is accompanied by some monetary sanction as well as some type of remedial
conduct controlling order within the EEC in order to eliminate any negative effects experienced by
any of the member states from the conduct.
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international economic position while also redressing violations of
the Treaty. While this writer does not mean to imply that the
Commission would act in such a manner, potential for abuse must
be recognized in light of the original purpose behind the creation
of the Commission as well as its recent activities regarding
economic effects created within the EEC. Further, this raises the
additional issue of examining the motives behind the use of
"effects" doctrine jurisdiction and whether such motives are the
product of political ideology.
Another problem that may arise is the unintentional use of
"effects" doctrine jurisdiction on other economic actors outside the
EEC. Assuming, the magnanimous intentions of the Commission,
any economic actor outside the EEC who now affects the
Community in an indirect way, will be subjected to the EEC
economic policy. Unfortunately,. economic actions are never
universally accepted in the international arena. Accordingly, one
economic viewpoint regarding competition may not be shared by
another country or a corporation based within that country.
Economic ideologies will make for interesting clashes between the
EEC and outside states. Inevitably, the self-interested attitude of
the EEC will clash with another economic body which also asserts
economic influence over commercial pursuits of business within its
borders. The Eastern Block countries are prime candidates for
challenging the authority of the EEC to assert jurisdiction over
business centered3 within the Eastern Block that produces effects
within the EEC.2
Post-Wood Pulp, the Commission now has the power to impose
its economic policies on other corporations outside the EEC
without finding actual conduct within the EEC. Offending parties
would then have to submit to jurisdiction in the EEC via the ECJ

233. With the increase in East-West relations, the idea that the U.S.S.R. has to enter the
competitive market in some form or another will become self evident as the bread lines continue to

grow within its borders and few other options are recognized other than to loosen the grip with which
their hands hold up the wall between themselves and the western economy. Hopefully, the Soviets
will learn from the example of their Eastern Block Comrades who have attempted or have already
done the same.
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in order to attempt to appeal such remedial action imposed by the
Commission.
V. CONCLUSION

With the decision in Wood Pulp, the European Economic
Community emerges as a political body capable of protecting its
economic policies. Any undertaking, regardless how remote, will
now potentially be subject to compliance with the Community's
Articles. The legitimacy of such power will come through its use.
While it would seem that the Commission is now armed with an
invincible tool with which to establish its economic policy, such
tools are always limited to their practical applications. It will be
interesting to see how large a step the Community takes with its
new form of jurisdiction and how this will affect the Unified
Common Market.
The EEC collectively is more powerful than its individual parts
allowing it to justify exercising "effects" doctrine jurisdiction.
Paradoxically, this may be the very problem with utilizing
"effects" jurisdiction in the future. Individual members may
exercise influence over the Commission allowing a particular
member to further its political agenda through the Cohmunity's
use of the "effects" doctrine. Without guidelines similar to those
adopted by the U.S. in the "qualified effects" approach, the
Community may undoubtedly find it difficult to apply "effects"
jurisdiction. Does the Community possess some unique quality
which will allow it to succeed where the U.S. failed? Or is the
Community destined to adopt a "qualified effects" approach in the
near future in order to legitimize its, use of "effects" doctrine
jurisdiction?
Steven T Gubner
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